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A Different Future For Social And Behavioral Science Research 
 
Shlomo S. Sawilowsky 
Educational Evaluation and Research 
College of Education 
Wayne State University 
   
 
The dissemination of intervention and treatment outcomes as effect sizes bounded by conf idence intervals in 
order to think meta-analytically was promoted in a recent article in Educational Researcher. I raise concerns 
with unfettered reporting of effect sizes, point out the con in confidence interval, and caution against thinking 
meta-analytically. Instead, cataloging effect sizes is recommended for sample size estimation and power 
analysis to improve social and behavioral science research. 
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Introduction 
 
Recently, an article appeared in Educational 
Researcher describing a possible future of social 
science research. It was one in which research 
results were reported in terms of effect sizes 
bounded by so-called confidence intervals. The 
notion of thinking meta-analytically was touted, 
and to that end, the publication of effect sizes was 
promoted (Thompson, 2002). 
 
Bracketed Intervals (BI) 
 I prefer the phrase “bracketed interval” 
(BI) instead of confidence interval, for reasons 
discussed below. The Frequentist perspective of 
the BI was described by Thompson (2002) as a 
95% degree of confidence that the interval 
contains the parameter in question. According to 
this view it would be inappropriate to say there is a 
95% probability that  :, the population mean,  is 
within the interval, but it would not be 
inappropriate to say there is a 95% level of 
confidence that :is in the interval. 
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 The first intervals of a statistical nature 
were developed by de Moivre between 1733 - 
1742, but they were not positioned for interval 
estimation. That feat was first accomplished by 
Lagrange in 1776. 
 De Moivre stated that the interval refers to 
“the probability that the value of [a parameter] is 
enclosed between the [upper and lower] limits” 
(cited by Hald, 1998, p. 23). Thus, in modern 
classification schemes, the original expression of 
bracketed intervals was from a Frequentist 
perspective. 
 Now, return to the term confidence. The 
general idea originated with Pytkowski (1932), but 
the first use of the phrase confidence interval and 
its theoretical development was by Neyman (1934, 
1937, 1939). He referred to 
 
determining certain intervals, 
which I propose to call the 
confidence intervals (see Note 1), 
in which we may assume are 
contained the values of the 
estimated characters of the 
population, the probability of an 
error in a statement of this sort 
being equal to or less than 1 - ,, 
where , is any number 0 < , < 1,  
chosen in advance. The number , 
I call the confidence coefficient. 
(1934, p. 562) 
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He opined that “the solution of the 
problem which I described as the problem of 
confidence intervals has been sought by the 
greatest minds since the work of Bayes 150 years 
ago” (Neyman, 1934, p. 563). However, because 
Jerzy Neyman, along with Egon Sharpe Pearson, 
originated the Frequentist version of modern 
statistics (Neyman & Pearson, 1928a, 1928b), his 
definition was purposefully not “Bayesian”, and 
instead followed the Frequentist paradigm. 
 The student of Bayes would demur, 
claiming it doesn’t make sense to ascribe the 95% 
moniker to : being found within the interval. The 
1-"% probability only pertains prior to the 
collection of data, whereas afterwards either the 
parameter falls within the interval or it doesn’t. 
 Instead, the Bayesian perspective is that 
the judicious usage of specific prior information 
regarding the estimate is the only meaningful way 
to obtain such a probability. Thompson (2002) 
characterized this as “a better definition” (p. 26). 
 The weakness of the Bayesian approach, 
(which Fisher, Neyman, Wald, and others 
rejected) is the reliance on subjective prior 
information. I cannot resolve the philosophical 
debate between the Frequentist and the Bayesian, 
but it is inappropriate to call either perspective 
“better”, as did (Thompson, 2002, p. 26). 
 Furthermore, the philosophical contro-
versy Thompson (2002) alluded to is not relevant 
in practical application. What is of importance is 
the role of interval estimation vs hypothesis tests. 
There has been a flurry of activity since the early 
1990s where the usage of hypothesis tests was 
taken to task, particularly within the American 
Educational Research Association (AERA) and 
other professional organizations. For example, 
Carver (1992) presented a paper to the AERA 
attempting to make a case against statistical 
significance testing, and recommended banning its 
usage altogether.  
 Amazingly and inexplicably, proponents 
of the case against hypothesis testing are also 
proponents of the usage of interval estimation. The 
root of their misconception is the misnomer 
confidence, as if bracketed intervals have a certain 
amount of confidence to them that hypothesis tests 
do not. There is no more confidence associated 
with an interval based on (1-")100%  than in a 
point null hypothesis based on ". 
 Thompson (2002) incorrectly construed 
my position in Educational Researcher, claiming I 
“erroneously equate CIs and statistical 
significance tests” (p. 29).  In an article with 
Thomas Knapp, I pointed out that the statistical 
criteria regarding the probabilities associated with 
bracketed intervals are the same as those for point 
null hypothesis tests, but certainly the two 
procedures cannot be equated. Regarding the 
equivalency of probabilities: (1) Is zero really not 
in the interval? (Type I error), (2) is zero really in 
the interval?  (Type II error), and (3) is the width of 
the interval at a minimum (comparative statistical 
power)? The probabilities associated with these 
criteria are exactly the same (Knapp & 
Sawilowsky, 2001). 
 These three points are congruent with a 
careful examination of Neyman (1934). He 
equated the boundaries of the interval with the 
probabilities of classical Fisherian “fiducial” limits 
of 21(x) and 22(x), which represent the lower and 
upper bound of the bracketed interval. With a 
passing reference to the famous debate in the 
literature on what Sir Ronald Fisher meant by 
fiducial, Neyman  (1934) did not dissociate the so-
called confidence of the bracketed interval from 
the probabilities used in its construction: 
 
Since the word “fiducial” has... 
caused misunderstandings I have 
already referred to, and which in 
reality cannot be distinguished 
from the ordinary concept of 
probability, I prefer to avoid the 
term and call the intervals [21(x), 
22(x)] the confidence intervals. (p. 
590) 
 
 Although Wald (1950) subsumed both 
hypothesis tests and interval estimation in a single 
model, and expressed them as specific cases of the 
general theory of statistical decision functions, that 
does not mean the two procedures are equivalent 
in every respect. After pointing out the 
probabilities associated with BIs and hypothesis 
tests are the same, I noted there is an advantage of 
BIs over point null hypothesis tests. It results in a 
range of possible values wherein the parameter 
might fall, whereas hypothesis tests do not. 
 This doesn’t appear to be the tremendous 
advantage that many proponents claim it to be. 
What added benefit is there in knowing, for 
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example, that the BI for a student’s Wechsler IQ 
was 97-103 from a educator’s perspective? 
Furthermore, in Knapp and Sawilowsky (2001), 
we mentioned specific data analysis situations 
where the BI would be preferred over the 
hypothesis test, as well as the reverse. 
 I also pointed out there are areas of 
concern in unbridled promotion of BIs (Knapp & 
Sawilowsky, 2001): (1) Some statistics are not 
amenable to the determination of standard errors, 
relying instead on theoretically interesting but 
practically questionable asymptotic variances 
(which are mathematical inventions pertaining to 
the world of infinite sample sizes). This may make 
the BI yield poorer statistical properties than point 
hypothesis testing. (2) There is the question of 
whether or not the interval should be symmetric 
about the sample statistic (Low, 1997). 
 (3) There is the problem of the effects of 
measurement error in constructing the interval 
(Nunnally, 1978). (4) Here, I add yet another 
concern: Bienaymé’s complaint in 1852 against 
using BIs based on a single parameter expressed as 
a continuum on a line. Instead, he proposed the 
concept of Bracketed Ellipsoids, where 
simultaneous regions are constructed taking into 
account multiple parameters. For example, two 
parameters result in an ellipsoid continuum on a 
Cartesian plane. 
 
Meta-Analysis  
 These issues regarding BIs apply to all 
statistics, including effect sizes. Thompson (2002) 
focused on effect sizes to provide fodder for meta-
analyses. This became necessary following Gene 
Glass’ presidential address on meta-analysis to the 
AERA in April of 1976, because modern meta-
analysis depends on the proliferation of effect 
sizes. 
 Thompson (2002) viewed effect sizes as 
the enabler in thinking meta-analytically. His 
exuberance with meta-analysis led him to 
recommend that effect sizes “can and should be 
reported and interpreted in all studies, regardless 
of whether or not statistical tests are reported” 
(Thompson, 1996, p. 29), and “even [for] non-
statistically significant effects” (Thompson, 1999, 
p. 67). The same argument had previously been 
made by Carver (1979, 1993). 
 However, Sawilowsky and Yoon (2001, 
2002) reported a brief Monte Carlo simulation 
demonstrating the trouble with reporting research 
findings via effect size in the absence of statistical 
significance. The practice will wreak havoc in the 
literature, as the Monte Carlo simulation 
demonstrated that an intervention of random 
numbers will produce typical effect sizes that are 
not near zero, but rather, are at a magnitude Cohen 
(1988) calls a small treatment effect. 
 Roberts and Henson (2002) purported to 
rebut these results. However, their study was not a 
Monte Carlo simulation of typical effect sizes 
produced under the truth of the null hypothesis. 
Instead, it was a Monte Carlo study of the bias in 
d, a topic irrelevant to the point being made. See 
the ensuing Invited Debate in this issue of the 
Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods. 
 There have been many articles published 
here and there by a variety of authors, including 
myself, that addressed specific methodological and 
substantive issues with meta-analyses. In addition, 
I have raised questions about thinking meta-
analytically (e.g., Knapp & Sawilowsky, 2001). 
Rather than reviewing that literature here, I find it 
more instructive to recite an excerpt from Glass’ 
(2000) most recent vision of research synthesis: 
 
In the twenty-five years between 
the first appearance of the word 
"meta-analysis" in print and today, 
there have been several attempts 
to modify the approach, or 
advance alternatives to it, or 
extend the method to reach 
auxiliary issues. If I may be so 
cruel, few of efforts have added 
much... If our efforts to research 
and improve education are to 
prosper, meta-analysis will have 
to be replaced by more useful and 
more accurate ways of 
synthesizing research findings. 
 
Sample Size Estimation and Power Analysis 
 The role of effect sizes in sample size 
determination and power analysis is an entirely 
different matter from that of meta-analysis. The 
first part of my professorial career could be 
summarized by the many consultations I had with 
students, teachers, faculty, and researchers outside 
of academe on the “how large should my sample 
be?” question. The bottleneck was obtaining an 
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estimate of the effect size, which is necessary to 
enter Cohen’s (1988) sample size and power 
tables. I was not alone; every colleague I discussed 
this matter with in the past twenty years has 
reported the same difficulty. 
  I wrestled with this problem for a decade. 
During that time I had a series of written and 
telephone conversations with, and initiated by, 
Jacob Cohen. He recognized the weaknesses in 
educated guessing (Cohen, 1988, p. 12) or using 
his rules of thumb for small, medium, and large 
effect sizes (p. 532). I suggested cataloging and 
cross-referencing effect size information for 
sample size estimation and power analysis as a 
more deliberate alternative. 
 Cohen expressed keen interest in this 
project. His support led to me to delivering a paper 
at the annual meeting of the AERA on the topic of 
a possible encyclopedia of effect sizes for 
education and psychology (Sawilowsky, 1996). 
The idea was to create something like the 
“physician’s desk reference”, but instead of 
medicines, the publication would be based on 
effect sizes. (I presented papers every year at 
AERA from 1985 - 2000, but this session had a 
higher attendance than most of them put together.) 
I doubt any of those listening to the presentation 
envisioned a future for quantitative social and 
behavioral science research with sample size 
estimation and power analysis forever relegated to 
prestidigitation. 
 Encouraged by colleagues, in 1999 and 
again in 2000, I submitted proposals to the U. S. 
Department of Education to fund a  print and 
electronic encyclopedia project. Thirty-five 
experts on effect sizes and meta-analysis wrote 
supportive letters (Table 1). A summit would be 
held with these experts, the most recent ten ye ars 
of ninety journals in education and psychology 
would be culled for effect sizes and cataloged, and 
an internet-based data-base would be created in 
which authors/journal editors could submit 
additions or updates. Alas, the proposals were not 
judged to be a funding priority. Subsequently, I 
had a series of e-mail and telephone conversations 
with Herbert Walberg on creating the 
encyclopedia sans funding, but the enormity of the 
project was prohibitive. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Supporters of the Encyclopedia of Effect 
Sizes Project: 
__________________________________________ 
William Asher, Purdue University 
Betsy Becker, Michigan State University 
John Behrens, Arizona State University 
Patricia Busk, University of San Francisco 
C. Mitchel Dayton, University of Maryland 
Robert Donmoyer, Ohio State University 
Susan Embretson, University of Kansas 
Gene Glass, Arizona State University 
Robert Grissom, San Francisco State University 
John Hunter*, Michigan State University 
Carl Huberty, University of Georgia 
Harvey Keselman, University of Manitoba 
John Kim, San Francisco State University 
Roger Kirk, Baylor University 
Thomas Knapp, Ohio State University 
Dennis Leitner, Southern Illinois University 
Joel Levin, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Lisa Lix, Private Scholar 
Jorge Mendoza, University of Oklahoma 
Theodore Micceri, University of South Florida 
Isadore Newman, University of Akron 
Steve Olejnik, University of Georgia 
Liora Pedhazur-Schmelkin, Hofstra University 
Bob Rosenthal, University of California-Riverside 
Donald Rubin, Harvard University 
Frank Schmidt, University of Iowa 
Michael Seaman, University of South Carolina 
Ronald Serlin, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Juliet Shaffer, University of California-Berkeley 
Bruce Thompson, Texas A&M University 
Howard Wainer, ETS 
Herbert Walberg, University of Illinois-Chicago 
Rand Wilcox, University of Southern California 
Joe Wisenbaker, University of Georgia 
Bruno Zumbo, University of N. British Columbia 
_________________________________________ 
Notes: *Deceased. Affiliations were accurate in 
1999-2000.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Sample size estimation and power analysis in 
every grant funded by the U. S. Department of 
Education and every article published in AERA 
journals are based on guessing or Cohen’s (1988) 
rules of thumb. Those practices could be 
discontinued in a different future of social and 
behavioral science research. Along with a re-
commitment to true experimental design 
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(Sawilowsky, 1999), a compendium of effect sizes 
could improve research design in education and 
psychology, and propel disciplined inquiry 
forward in a scientific fashion. 
 The encyclopedia could be a globally 
cooperative effort among professional organi-
zations and learned societies, their journal editors, 
and authors. It could be internet-based and updated 
in real-time, cross-referenced by discipline/sub-
discipline and independent variable, have effect 
size entries categorized by statistically significant 
studies at various " levels, and classified 
according to whether the journal was peer 
reviewed. Finally, entries should be categorized 
based on whether the effect size arose from a true 
experimental design vs. quasi-experimental, post 
hoc, survey, and other non-experimental designs. 
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